讲座信息

时间：2025年9月26日（周五）15:00-16:30

邀请人：王子贺 菠菜平台高瓴人工智能学院准聘副教授

陈诉人：李瑛恺 新加坡国立大学副教授

陈诉题目：Information Disclosure Makes Item Pricing Competitive

陈诉摘要：We study multi-item pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller controls information, even uniform pricing guarantees at least half of the optimal revenue. Item pricing performs even better, achieving at least 50.17% of the optimum in general. Moreover, for negatively affiliated value distributions, item pricing is revenue-optimal. Our results highlight the power of information design in making simple item pricing mechanisms competitive in multi-dimensional settings.

陈诉人：李瑛恺 新加坡国立大学副教授

陈诉人简介：Yingkai Li is an Assistant Professor (Presidential Young Professor) in Economics at the National University of Singapore. He was a postdoctoral fellow at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics and the Department of Computer Science at Yale University, working with Prof. Dirk Bergemann and Prof. Yang Cai. He received his PhD in Computer Science from Northwestern University, advised by Prof. Jason Hartline. He completed his BS in Computer Science from Shanghai Jiaotong University in 2015 and his MS in Computer Science from Stony Brook University in 2018.